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A double answer is given to the question: 'does global citizenship require
modero technology?' First, it does not because the idea of global citizenship
as membership of a universal moral cormnunity goes back to the ancient
Stoics. Second, it does, because the adequate expression of global
responsibility in the modern world requires the development oí global
culture and global institutions for which modern technologies of
communication and transportation are crucial: modern technology
furthennore gives us both knowledge of the world and the capacity to act
at a distance. The discussion provides a peg on which to defend the idea oí
global citizenship in both its ethical and its institutional aspects against the
criticisms made of it for instance from relativist or communitarian
perspectives.
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bal ethic, global obligationsjresponsibilities, globaIisation, institutions,
motivation, relativism, universal values.
Resumen: ¿Requiere la ciudadanía global la tecnología moderna?
La pregunta "requiere la ciudadanía global la tecnología moderna?"
recibe una doble respuesta. En primer lugar no la requiere ya que la idea
de ciudadano global como miembro de una comunidad moral univer-
sal se remonta a los antiguos estóicos. Por otro lado sí la requiere, ya
que la expresión adecuada de la responsabilidad global en el mundo
moderno necesita del desarrollo de una cultura global y de instituciones
globales, para lo cual las tecnologías modernas de comunicación y trans-
porte son cruciales: la tecnología moderna nos brinda tanto un conoci-
miento del mundo como la capacidad de actuar a distancia. La discu-
sión brinda un punto de apoyo con base en el cual defender la idea de
ciudadanía global, tanto en su aspecto ético como en su aspecto
institucional, de las críticas que se plantean desde, por ejemplo, pers-
pectivas relativistas y comunitaristas.
Palabras claves: ciudadanía, comunitarismo, cosmopolitismo, cultu-
ra, ética globaC obligaciones/responsabilidades globales, globalización,
instituciones, motivación, relativismo, valores universales.
1. Introduction
One immediate answer to this question might be: 'The answer isohvious! Ofeourse being a global citizen requires modero teeh-
nology. How on earth could one know about a famine in Ethiopia} let
alone send assistanee to that eountry, without modern teehnology?'
However ane needs to remember that there were people in the ancient
worId like the Stoics who regarded themselves as citizens of the
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world, and that that did not involve modern technology, but a certain
conception of one's status as a human being. So in one sense being a
global citizen, that i8 accepting a global ethic or identity, does not
require modem technology. But in the sense of 'someone who can
effectively exercise global responsibility in the modern world', then
global citizenshíp does involve modern technology. The simple
answer 'Yes and No -It depends on what you mean' does indeed
summarise my position, but a whole lot of highly contentious issues
need to be raised, if we are to understand why these two answers can
be given and what the relationship i8 hetween them.1
The issues are important partly because 1 am also addressing a
wider issue concerning global citizenship: how important is it that we
think oí ourselves as global citizens? The title oí the article is kind of
peg on which to hang what 1 take to be one oí the most important
matters facing us at the beginning of the twenty-first century: what
needs to be done ifwe are to tackle all the irnrnense problems facing the
world? Many things of course, not least the development of technolo-
gies to serve humankind. Arguably though a key factor is the transfor-
mation of consciousness, from one dominated by national and other
forms of localised identity and loyalties, to one in which our global
identity has a proper place. This is not an argument against other
levels of identity and loyalty, but an argument for a change of attitude
and for an inclusion of another level oí identity wruch in tum will
affect the policies of nation-states and intemationa.l business.
Sorne examples may serve to introduce what 1take to be a variety oí
actions which are expressions of global citizensrup. In 1998 a large
number of people converged on Birmingham in Britain to form a large
human chain around the place where the G8 countries -the rich in-
dustrialised countries- were meeting to discuss Third World debt and
in effect their management of the global economy. Trus chain was a
symbol of their solidarity with the poor of the world who suffer becau-
se of the continuing impact of Third World debtr and an expression oí
the caH on the G8 countries to cancel the worst debts. Others may
prefer other form of actionr like writing to their Members of Parlia-
mentsj writing letters and articles for newspapers, and so on. At any
rate a groundswell of public concern has developed. It is 1 think no
accident that Gordon Brown the UK Chancellor and President
Clinton both strongly endorsed such cancellation. Whether such
political action is based political expedience and the calculation of
popularity or reflects empowerment or the use ofan opportunity to .do
what they think right anyway is another matter. The point is that
changing public opinion changes the parameters oí political action.
1 For a more elaborate account of the arguments for and against, cf. Dower
2002.
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Another kind oí global citizenship action takes the form of consu-
mer choice. As consumers we may avoid ~nvironmentallydamaging
products, or prefer to buy brands of coffee like Cafedirect, produced
and marketed by Third World co-operatives, rather than other com-
mercial brands oí coffee, in support oí better work conditions. In the
USA members of many churches got involved in the 1~70s in the Sanc-
tuary movement -giving Latin American refugees (ofien for economic
reasons) sanctuary in churches- thus conflicting with the authorities
in a global form oí civil disobedience. Perhaps one oí the most striking
examples oí the exercise oí global citizenship in recent years in'global
civil society' was the World Court Project where a groundswell oí
expressions oí Ipublic conscience' led to an advisory opinion being
sought by the United Nations from the World Court on the legality oí
possessing nuclear weapons in intemationaI law. Its opinion, which
in spirit though not straightforwardly carne out against their legality,
was issued on July 9th, 1996 (World Court 1996).
Now many oí these forms oí action, like the last two, may be critici-
sed by some as ineffectual or inappropriate. But the point needs to be
made that although one might reject the whole global perspective,
such criticisrns are more likely to come from a position in which sorne
other forms of action are supported in relation to global concerns, that
is from another global citizenship perspective, and in which those ac-
tions are acknowledged as the actions of ' global citizens'.
2. Outline oí Argument
Let me now outline an argument which 1shall then go through and
answer what seem to me to be the more obvious objections to its vario-
us stages.
(a) To accept a global ethic is to accept the idea of being a global
citizen: the idea that one is member of one moral dornain of aH hu-
man beings.
(b) Moral thought requires the aeceptance oí a global ethic with
two components: (i) sorne universal values (H) sorne global obligatio-
ns, Le. obligations which are global or trans-national in scope.
(e) A global ethic adequate to the late 20th Century and earIy 21st
Century requires the socio-political expression of global citizenship.
(d) Socio-political global citizenship requires both (i) the culture of
global citizenship (involving the internalisation of the identity of
persons as global citizens) and (ii) the institutions of global citizens-
hipo
(e) A necessary condition for the development of the culture and
institutions of global citizenship is the development of modern tech-
nologies (especially those of communication).
(f) Thereforef modem technology is neeessary for the actualisation
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of the idea oí global citizenship in the modero world (though it is not
necessary for the idea itself).2
3. The Idea of Global Citizenship
As 1 índicated earlier, the idea of global citizenship goes back to
ancient thought. Many oi the Stoics accepted and proclaimed the idea
that human beings were I cosmo-polites', literally citizens oE the cos-
mos or universe. Although this conception of course is much broader
than citizenship of the world, it did include the latter in the sense that
all human beíngs were seen to be part of the larger 'polis' or communi-
ty. What they were contrasting this with was the membership oí parti-
cular established political communities -of city-states, countries or
even the Roman Empíre. That one was bom an Athenian or Cretan or
part of the Roman Empíre was simply a contingent fact -an accident
oí bírth- to be contrasted to something more basic about one's nature
and identity. The idea of being a'citizen' has to be treated with sorne
caution here. It is not meant to imply a relationship which one has
with a state or organised potitica! community led by a ruler, emperor
or other form of government, but it is meant to imply the existence oí a
wider communíty to which one has sorne loyalty and with which one
has sorne identity.3 Neither for the Stoics, nor for most cosmopolitans
since, does cosmopolitanism imply the need for a world government
(though sorne have advocated it, notably H.G. Wells).4
What 1think is oí enduring importance froro the ideas of the Stoics
and others is the thought that human beíngs belong to one moral com-
munity or domain. Although we do as a roatter oí contíngent fact also
live in other more particular and smaUer cornmunities -statel town,
family- it is an important fact that we also belong to a larger cornmu-
nity (civitas maxirna) made up of aH human beíngs (and, for many,
much else besides). The word 'citizen' here is not doing very much
conceptual work, in that it is really on1y signifies the basic idea of
being a memberoía moral community. (We will however make the idea
of Jcitizen' do much more work later on.) But even here at this stage
tbis basic relationsbip presupposes a nurnber of important elements.
2 1should perhaps explain how 1came to be interested in these matters. 1 taught
for a number of years a course on etrucs and intemational relations, defending the
idea of a global ethic or eosmopolitanism (as it is ofien called) agaínst rival theories
of intemational relations, an outcome of which was World Ethics - the New Agenda
(Dower 1998). During 1997-19991 directed a Project devoted to exploring ways"in
which different kinds of courses on global citizenship available to undergraduates
may be developed, and sorne of the thinking of this arUcIe was stimulated by
discussions in this Project group.
3 Cf. Brown 1992.
4 Cf. Heater 1996, fo! an excellent historieal survey.
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First, there are sorne core values which make it a conununity; second,
a sense oí eommitrnent to and loyalty towards the comrnunity as a
whole and towards its members.5
4. A Global/World Ethic
The acceptance of these two elements is tantamount to accepting
what1shall call a global ethie or world ethic. A world ethic is an ethie
whieh asserts that there are certain universal values and eertain glo-
bal responsibilities or duties. When a thinker asserts a global ethic, he
or she is not saying that these values and responsibilities are in fact
already aceepted by everyone or every society. But he or she is saying
that these values and responsibilities are to-be-accepted, either becau-
se they are true or because they are reasonable. Often in the past, con-
flicts like those generated by the Crusades, the Conquistadors or the
proselytising activities of 19th century missionaries in Africa oecu-
rred partIy because believers in global values soughtto spread them to
those who did not aecept them. It is not however necessary that this is
howa global ethic has to be const1'ued or promoted: a global ethic
wmch affirms solidarity 01' commitment to tackle needs anywhere on
the one hand with sensitivity towards different cultures on the other
hand is what 1advocate -the global analogue of a multicultural socie-
ty which combines responsibility for all with affirmation of diversity.6
Meanwhile we should note that there are many different forms of
global ethics and kinds of theory supportive of thero. Apart from reli-
gious conceptions sueh as the Christian conception of the brotherho-
od oí humankind, ethicaI theories -sueh as Kant's theory, utilitaria-
rusm or human rights theories- all point to the same basic position: all
human beings have the same ethical status, and in principIe one has
duties to be concerned with any other human beings.
It was Kant himself who promoted the idea of cosmopolitanism in
the modem era. There were really two elements to his cosmopoIíta-
nism, his basic moral theory which postulated that it was here and
now our duty to respect the rational agency oí aH fel10w human be-
ings, and his teleological conception of history in which, as illustrated
in his essay 'The idea oí a universal history with a cosmopolitan in-
tent' he envisaged a long way off the emergence of a federal world
arder of which we would be in the polítical sense 'citizens' (ef Kant
1991a). Two things should be noted. Kant did not, despite his reputa-
tion in intemationaI relations circles of being a revolutionary, advoca-
te the disbandment of the nation-state system in favour of world go-
vernment. Far from it -he saw world government as dangerous. Ra-
5 For a fun account ol the Stoics cf. Heater 2002, see also Dower 2003.
6 For the idea of solidarist-pluralism, see Dower 1998.
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ther he advocated the development of republican constitutions, which,
because they were founded on principIes of freedom and equality, as
shown as explicitly as anywhere in the constitution of the USA,
would incline men to live peacefully with one another, and thus
would come to adopt certain articles of peace which would guarantee,
in the words oi another famous essay, 'perpetual peace' (cf. Kant
1991b). Second, even if we doubt the eventual emergence oí a world
federal system, we can still see in Kant a powerful conception of a
cosmopolitan moral arder in the here and now, in his stress on the
rational agency of human beíngs as the basis of a universal morality,
or a global ethic as 1am calling it.
This idea oí a global morality which underpins what 1shall call the
moral conception of global citizenship is of course not uncontTaver-
siaL Many thinkers past and present have denied it far a variety oí
reasons. 1focus on two. First, relativist arguments are advanced, whe-
ther in the more c1assical forms of thinkers like Protagoras or more
recently under the guiseofpostmodemist rejectionofthe Enlightenment's
project of universal reason. According to these arguments values vary
from culture to culture so there is no universal morality. Related to
this, but coming from a slightly different angle, are communitarian
arguments, from writers like Sandel and MacIntyre that values and
duties arise from the particular traditions oí established communities
(cf. Sandel1982; MacIntyre 1981). Thus MacIntyre once condemned
those who advocate global citizenship by saying that in making
peopIe citizens of everyone they made them rootless citizens of
nowhere.7
A full reply to these difficulties is not possible here, but 1 merely
remark the fallowing. First, reIativism makes the idea of progress sus-
pect and the position of minority dissent difficult to make sense of. But
it also, despite itself, loses the cornrnon core of values in human nature
which is ultimateIy the bulwark against arbitrary tTeatment. Karl-Otto
Apel once noted that it was Spanish philosaphers like Vitoria who
were able to condemn the Spanish treahnent of the Aztecs from their
'naturallaw' position, whereas the relativist who treats other cultures
as 'other' or 'different' has no theoretical ground to protest if the
'other' lacks the common ethical core associated with 'humanity' (ef
Apel1992). If relativists pride themselves with respecting diversity,
this is an accident, and certainly not part of the logic oí their position.
As for MacIntyre's remanstratian, it is not clear that there calUlot be -
indeed as we shall see, it is cIear that there must be-Ievels of identi,ty
which are meaningful at the globallevel, though oí course they does
not rule out more genuinely locallevels as well. As for the theoretical
point about the source of morality, moral community as based on esta-
7 Quoted in Almond 1990.
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blished traditions surely needs ta express values wlúeh we ean de-
fend independently of them, rather than the other way round. It is
beeause aH human beings matters that we need to develop established
eornmunity to express this and make eertain forros of action more live-
lyand robust -but 1anticipate my later argument here- 1eonclude that
neither relativism nor cornmunitarianism provides a sueeessful eha-
llenge to the idea of global citizenship as a moral clairn about the
worId.
5. The Modern World
1now tum to the eonditions of the modem world. What makes active
global citizenslúp essential? It is of eourse a cliché to say that we live
in a highly interdependent or globalised world. 1just want to higlUight
several salient features of it. First, the fact is that our activities, in
industry and in the use of the land and sea¡ are severely damaging the
environment. Mueh of tlús is in the form of global impacts caused by
others for our sake. We also eontribute directly by our own acts to the
cumulative impacts¡ e.g. in buming fossil fuels. Second, the globali-
sation of the economy (called the global economy) involves vast com-
plex economic relationships such that OUT economic activities are con-
nected by long causal chains to what happens elsewhere in the world
-like workers getting mínimum wages on which they barely survive,
appalling safety standards and so on. What these two facts of globali-
satíon dernonstrate is thatl unlike the past¡ we are aH involved in
processes which are damaging to fellow humans and the environ-
ment at a distance. The third factor¡ the globalisation of institutionsl
both governmental and non-governmentat and of cornmunieationsl
has led to a massive increases in the capacity to take aetion to modera-
te the negative effects oi our actions and also positively to respond to
sufferingl whether or not we are implieated in being part of its cause.
It is said that'ought' implies I can/¡ that in order far us to say that we
ought to take action we must be able to take action. To be able to take
action requires both the knowledge that we can -provided by commu-
nication technologies- and the resourees and means to hand -provi-
ded by modem institutions (together with technologies, transport sys-
tems l etc.). That iSI we can, if we have the knowledge, take action at a
distance by joining Non-Govemmental Organisations, by campaigning
within the political system to influenee the direction of foreign policy
of our governments¡ by exerting our ínfluences as I ethicar consumers.
Another condition of OUT beingable to do things is available motivation
-a factor 1discuss later on.
The upshot of aH this is that the acceptance of a global etlúc eombi-
ned with the facts of the modern world -causal impaets, knowledge
and capacity for effective action at a distance- entail a level of active
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obligation far in excess of anything which would have in practice
been expected in the pasto Someone in the past might have accept the
ideal of universal charity or the message of the good Samaritan, but
rarely had the opportunity for effective expression of tlús beyond the
more immediate community in which she lived. But now that sarne
ethic, coupled with the realities of the world, leads to the recognition
that many things that can actually be done, and need to be done, take
their rationale and point from their effects on other parts of the world
or on the world as a whole.
What then we need is a recognition that in the modem world a
global citizen ought in fact to accept responsibility for her actions on a
global scale and see part of her significant duty the discharge of this
responsibility. For this to happen though two things will be needed-
the development of an appropriate culture and the development of
appropriate institutions. Both oí these require modem technology. But
before we expand on tlús, 1need to address two objections which may
be raised to the concIusions wlúch we have just reached -the argu-
ment from optimism, and the argument froro the Jhidden hand' combi-
ned with the value of liberty.
6. Objections
First, my concIusion will be resisted on the grounds that my reading
of the world situation is far too gloomy. Things are notanything like as
bad as 1sketched, and in any case, to the extent that there are problems
of poverty and environmental danger, as there undoubtedly are, these
will be effectively addressed through appropriate technological
adaptations. Human beings are, as Julian Simon once cIaimed, in
The Ultimate Resouree, intelligent, adaptable creatures who are
resourceful in finding new ways of responding to problems (ef
Simon 1981). We simply do not need peopIe generaIly to 'take on
the worId' or worry about problems at a distance from them: look
after the poverty and damage in your own backyard, and leave
others to get on with their own. Even if this position is adopted and
what is done is done as a contribution to a better world, and, "as the
adage goes, it is an example oí J think globalIy and act localIy', this
means just that -don't act globally. There is nothing reaIly to do. If
you are going to be global citizen, make sure you are inactive about
it.
Related to this line oí thought is the oId idea of Adam Smith's that
hidden hand mechanisms still work weIl. IfpeopIe and in particular
nation-states look after their own interests properIy in an enlighte-
ned way, then by a hidden hand process, aH will work out well in the
long run everywhere. Part oí this argument, often called economic
libertarianism, is a belief that peopIe should have, as a value in its
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own right, as much economic liberty as possible, and that generally
there are not extensive duties to come to the aid of others.
Though libertarian arguments are very fashionable at present, 1
have to say that such arguroents seem to fly in the face of the facts.
Since species continue to be destroyed at a steady rate and the absolu-
te poverty figures continue on their upward spira!, it is hard to think
that the relatively unregulated effect of human economic activity are
proving adequate or show that greater self-consdous efforts to act at a
distance are redundant.
What the last approach inustrates is an ímportant point about glo-
bal ethics and global citizenship. There may be a variety of global
ethics which can be adopted. 1do not mean different theories, which 1
have already mentionedt but different approaches about what is ac-
tually good for the world and what ought to be done. Being a global
citizen should not be seen, though it often is, as shorthand for being
com,mitted to Oxfam, Amnesty International, Friends of the Earth and
the Peace movement. Someone who thought that it really was impor-
tarlt that everyone adopt the individualistic and secular values of the
free market, would be, and might weIl see herself as, a global citizen
without supporting these organisations or their approaches -espeda-
By if she thought it worth making efforts to defend and promote these
libertarian values. This is to be expected.
Whatever the differences between citizenship at the globallevel and
citizenship in its normal polítical setting, this is certainly in common.
We do not expect a citizen -1 mean a good citizen in the sense of taking
his duty of citizenship seriously- necessarily to hold particular views
about what should be done. These views might faIl witmn a range of
positions froro the left to the right. So likewise it is with global citizens-
hipo So long as one holds on to the idea that aH humans matter in one
cornmunity of concem and that there are things which individuals
can do and do with reference to this wider whole, there may be
significant differences in the values to be promoted. That said, it is
probably true that for the majority of those who actively promote the
idea of global citizenship, there is a certain set of normative concerns
which drive them, such as solidarity with the poor, the need to change
our way oí life because of the environment, working for peace and
campaigning against human rights violations.
7. Institutional Framework needed
Earlier 1suggested that in order for this kind of active expression oí
global citizenship to be effective we need appropriate institutions and
culture, which in turn require modern technology for their existence.
The institutional opportunities for global citizenship can 1 think be
identified in three modes: the international system of states, the phe-
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nomenon of global trade and investment, and the development of
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs).8 These three phenomena
all represent aspects of the phenomenon of globalisation. Increasingly
in each area individuals can, if they so wish, exert influences in
respect to the global concerns which they have. This rnay seem
obvious in the case of NGOs, since NGOs are precisely the collective
expression of the cornmitments of individuals, and often have global
issues as the focus of their concems. (In this respect it does not matter
whether an NGO is formally a national one or an intemational one,
since a national one, like for instance the World Development
Movement in Britain, can have as its primary focus the position of the
poor in the South.)
Often the state system and the global economy are seen as quite the
opposite -powerful forces often acting contrary to the vaIues of global
citizens. Thus we have the powerful irnage of Marc Nerfin's paper
JlNot Prince nor Merchant but Plain Citizen", arguing the case for the
development of citizen power.9 But in fact the opportunities for the
expression of global citizenship power exist in the other two arenas as
welL Of course the intemational system may remain what it has large-
ly been -a society of nation-states primarny devoted to maintaining
the inter-national order itself along with state sovereignty and within
this framework, the promotion of national interests. However at the
end of the day, what governments promote is broadly a function oi
what their citizens want, and if, especially in a democracy, large num-
bers of citizens signalled their concerns for global issues, things would
change. It is of course a big 'if'. But the reality is that, as it is, citizens
have, at least in democratic countries, ample opportunity to lobby,
influence the política! parties they join and so on, and if their agenda is
a global agenda, this wiIl have impacts onnational policy. Likewise, we
are ofien told about irresistible market forces, but at the end oi the day,
markets require consumers, and the potential for the exercise of ethical
consumer power cannot be underestímated. Again this is a big 'if', but
my point is that we can be global citizens in the market place, if we so
wish, and if enough of us so wished, changes would be possible.
The institutional framework exists therefore as something through
which we can express in effective ways our global citizenship. Do
these institutional facts however establish citizenship? To make any
real sense ofcitizenship (other than as a pure moral conception which
we discussed earlier) we need a much more formalised structure than
is indicated above. Consider the idea oí being a European citizen -an
idea many oí us in Europe find difficult enough making anything of
anyway! Surely this requires European institutions far more elaborate
8 For a {ull account of globalisation, ef Scholte 2000.
9 Nerfin 1987.
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than anything we have on a global scale; and more impartantly we
need a relationship defined formally in a legal ar constitutional fra-
mework oí the rights and duties of European citizenship, including
the right to participate in elections of members to the Eurapean parlia-
ment and so an. That is precisely what we do not have an a global
scaJe. Though the UN Charter started its Preamble with the words J we
the peoples', "it is primarily an inter-state organisation not a peopIes'
organisation.
This line of thought needs to be resisted, because it depends upon an
over-simple dichatomy: either global citizenship in the purely moral
sense oí being a member of a moral community or fuIl-blown citizens-
hip in a single political community under worId government. There is
surely a halfway house position, which is both intelligible and attrac-
tivel in which the idea of'citizenship' does do sorne conceptual work,
but not that identical to that associated with citizenship of nation-
states. 1have argued against this dichotomy in another paper (ef Do-
wer 2000), taking as my target a paper by David Miller entitled 'Boun-
ded Citízenship' (Miller1998). Briefly his argument is that, although
we have global obligations, it is not helpfuI to express this through the
language of citizenship, since citizenship is clearly linked to particu-
lar established political communities, with clearly defined rights and
duties, participation in decision-making and a shared moral culture.
This, according to Miller, is shown more cIearly in the republican
conception of citizenship (as opposed to the liberal conception with
its emphasis on the holding of rights), in the tradition of Aristotle and
Rousseau. In reply one needs to note that ofcourse citizenship is highly
contested concept itself. For instance, if 'rights' are seen as central such
as the social rights which T.H. Marshall is well known for pressing, the
humanrights framework in the worId already provides a framework for
global citizenship discourse (ef MarshaJI 1973). And this is already
important from the point of view of oppressed people in poorer
countries who wish to c1aim, as citizens of the world, their human
rights. But it ís better to take Miller on his own terros, and argue that
other elements of active citizenship or participation are equally
applicable at a globallevel.
8. Cultural Framework
1now tum to the 'culture' side of the story. Elise Boulding once write
a book entitled Building a Global Civie Culture expressing the impor-
tance of this (ef Boulding 1990). If peopIe general1y are both to accept
and ta act on a global ethic, then there has to deveIop a culture in
which certain attitudes, identities, loyalties and priorities are em-
bedded -in custom, traditions, shared moral rules. Of course such a
culture oí a shared acceptance of certain values and priorities is not a
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necessary eondition for someone to have certain ethical views. If that
were so~ no moral progress would be possible, and minoríty moral
opinion would be unintelligible, since individuals must be able to
think out ethical positions prior to and independent of what most
peopIe think or what is already in public moral culture. But moral
commitment is likely to be more effective precisely when it is shared
and re-emorced in a cornrnunity oí concern. (This is the part of the
truth about ethics contained in communitarianism). F.H. Bradley,
the 19th Century British political idealist~once compared rnorality to
body and soul-the body being the publicly shared rules, practices
and institutions of a society, the soul the individual moral wills oí
agents which breathe life into them (ef Bradley 1878). This is broadly
right -though my global and non-conservative application of the
insight probably would not have pleased Bradley! It is precisely
with the development oí an ethical culture in which certain global
identities and values are embodied, that people will be induced to
act out their global responsibilities.
The assumption here is that we can say of peopIe that they do
have global responsibilities as global citizens~whether or not they
currently accept these. They rnay not accept it because they have
different values (perhaps non-global) or they have different views
oí the I facts I of the world and also question the necessity oí certain
forms of collective adion. Piet Hein, the Danish poet~ famous for
his one-line poerns¡ once stood up at a conference and said 'We are
global citizens with tribal souls' (Barnaby 1988: 192). What he
meant by this is that although objectively we are global citizens,
that is moral agents with global responsibi1ities~many oí us most
or aH the time, and aH of us sorne of the time, have a more localised
sense of identity with loyalty to the localised group of sorne kind
which dominates our consciousness to the exclusion of others.
Whether or not we actually assent in sorne inteIlectuaIly weak way
to c1aims that we have global responsibilities~these values are not
alive or at the forefront of our moral consciousness, and hence faH
to inspire the requisite forrns of action. To employ the language of
another philosopher~David Cooper, the world and our moral enga-
gernent with it are not part of an emotionally charged ¡field of signi-
ficance' (ef Cooper 1992). The encouragement of the development
of such moral fields of significance is precisely what is needed, and
for that the development of a public culture is necessary. In this
connection~ the development of human rights thinking~ not" so
much in legal instruments (though these are important too) but in
the shared values of peopIe who see thernselves as both having a
certain status and as belongíng to a global community in which in
principIe there is solidarity and support from others elsewhere, is
important. This importance 1 think can be affirmed even by those
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moral theorists who at the level of theory would prefer a different
theory of morality than a foundation in human rights.
The importance of tros for education cannot of course be underesti-
mated. In this connection we need to note the arguments oí the Ameri-
can philosopher Martha Nussbaum. In a spedal edition oí the Boston
Revíew (Autumn 1994) she argued for cosmopolitan education -the
need to educate American children to think of themselves as world
citizens with not merely better knowledge oí the rest of the world but
sorne understanding of their perspectives. She gave four main argu-
ments: first, we will know better who really are -our essential human-
ness not OUT accidental American-ness or whatever nationality we
have; second, we wilI be more willing and able to carry out our global
obligatíons wruch are real and pressing, especially towards the bi-
Ilion oí the worldJs very poor; thirdl collective global problems e.g. of
the environment necessitate such a global outlook; and fourth, if a
multícultural sodety like America is to become genuinely tolerant and
accepting of diversity internallYJ it can only do so on the basis of uni-
versal values: bluntly the Chinese in the Chinatowns of the USA are to
be respected beeause the Chinese in China are to be respected. The rest
oí the spedal edition was devoted to various American intellectuals
takíng issue with her. She is nothing if not controversial! But 1com-
mend her approach to you. Many oí the articles and others are publis-
hed in a book entitled Foy Lave ofCauntry (el Nussbaum 1994: 1996).
But there is an interesting question wruch is raised as to how one
goes about promoting such global values. In 1998 1attended a seminar
discussing Britainls Department of International Developmenfs
White Paper Eliminating Global Paverty. CIare Short the Government
Minister joined the seminar at the end and engaged in discussion
with uso When 1suggested that the section on development education
might include sorne educatíon on global or world citizenship, she
retorted that this was reaIly quite inappropriatel because ninety-nine
people out of a hundred sirnply would not resonate to the idea oí being
called a world or global dtizen! 1suggested that the White Paper itself
was premised on global obligation and the idea of one global sodety
and the idea of global citizenship was merely eomplementing and
reinforcing this. She accepted that these values underlay the Report
hut rejected the tactic of using this language. Whilst it is obvious from
what 1have said that 1do not think we should avoid introducing the
terminology -otherwise it wiU not make headway- 1 realised af-
terwards that a serious íssue of approach had been raised. Indeed
when 1told this story to rny Global Citizenship Research Group, 1was
mildly surprised that sorne shared her view that in any course for
students on global citizenshipl one should approach the idea oí glo-
bal citizenship only at the end, having got students interested in is-
sues like the environmentl poverty or peaceJand then say at the end, in
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effect, 'whether you realised tros or not, what you have been engaging
with are the issues of global ethics and the attitudes you have adopted
of those of global citizens!'. Clearly this is a matter of 'horses for cour-
ses': what will be effective in one context will not be in another. What
matters of course is not whether the phrases J global citizen' or 'world
citizen' are used but whether a culture in which concem for the world
is expressed and felt is developed.
9. The Need for Modern Technology
1 now tum to technology, and to the thesis that without modem
technology the kind of global citizenship 1 have been identifying
would not be possible. The two aspects of modem technology -and by
'modern' 1am quite arbitrarily thinking primarily oí the last fifty years
or so- which are more relevant to my theme are the technologies of
cornmunication and the technologies of transportation. Ideas, infor-
mation, decisions, agreements can be transmitted and exchanged
with great ease across the world, between individuals and groups in
different parts oí the world -the Internet being the most conspicuous
manifestation of this phenomenon in recent years. Likewise the ease
of communications across networks facilitate the growth of larger íns-
titutions and organisations, whether governrnent multinationals, or
Non-Govenunental Organisation. Larger and faster transportation
systems on land, at sea and in the air facilitate the movement of goods
and personnel across the world. If we concentrate on the 'active' side
of global citizenship, the acceptance of obligations and responsibili-
ties, these two facts are of paramount importance, for as 1noted earlier,
it is when we have both knowledge of what happens elsewhere, and
the capacity to engage in actions which have distant effects, that the
stage is set for appropriate action. The third factor of course is moral
commitment to do these things and that, as I have just indicated, is
strengthened significantly by the cultural setting in which we have
enlarged identities as citizens oí Iarger communities. Again the
factors of travel and communication playa crucial role in creating this
culture, through travel to other parts of the world on business or on
holiday, communications with others across cyber-space if not
through post or telephone, seeing TV prograrnmes about other parts of
the world and so on.
It may be said that often travel and communications do not make
good citizens of people. We can watch endless TV about the rest of tIi.e
world but still remain locked in parochial sentiments. We can travel to
other parts of the world in a 'been there, done that' glaze of mind that
takes very Httle in. This is to be granted. But note that 1said modem
technology is necessary for global citizenship. 1 did not say it was
sufficient or adequate on its own.
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But there is another slightly darker side to the role of modero techno-
logy in global citizenship. There is a sense that modero technology
has made global citizens of us, whether we like itor noto If we recall the
idea behind Piet Hein's rernark, we are in sorne objective sense global
citizens just because modem technology has transformed the causal
nexus in which we acto That is, it has extended the causal Jfootprint',
as environmentalists sometirnes calI it, beyond the local to the global
in rnany difierent ways. Here the technologies whichhave created the
global repercussions of our actions are more general, and are modern
in a more extended sense of modern, going back severa! hundreds oí
year to the time when the rise of modero science and associated tech-
nologies gave human beings unprecedented power over nature. It is
the technologies oí extracting resources froro the natural environment
and transforrning them through industrial processes into serviceable
goods wmch have caused major damaging effects in the planet as a
whole. If the lines of moral responsibility broadly follow the lines oí
causality and if modem technologies underpinning our way of life
have made OUT causal impacts global, then OUT responsibility becomes
global.
The aboye remarks may seem to indicate that what is driving this
account are environmental impacts. But this is not so. The global eco-
nomy, driven by the technologies of extraction, transformation and
transportation, inextricably links us with the fate of others across the
world, and though most oí us do not literally actively ,cause' the suffe-
ring and poverty of others, we are so intimately linked to the cycIe oí
events in which the poverty is a part, that we can hardly disrniss it as
not in OUT domain.1o Thirdly what nations do to promote their securi-
ty increasingly impacts on the security oí others -responses to Sept-
ember 11th 2001 and Iraq in 2002-2003 have shown how contentious
the pursuit of security really is. The technologies oí mass destruction -
nuclear, biological and chemical- Ieave us aIl vulnerable to shared
dangers, whilst the arms industry (in which sadly the USA and the
UK are market leaders) simply contributes through arms sales to
oppression and human rights violations in other parts of the world.
The nub of what 1aro saying is tlús: modem teehnologies on the one
hand make us global citizens by making us, whether we like it or not,
responsible collectively for global problems; but at the same time they
enable us to find the motivational dynamics to exercise our responsibi-
lity to tackle those problems. Responsibility is after aH Janus-faced: it
looks backward to what we are responsible for having eaused or allo-
wed, and forward to what we have a responsibility for doing.
10 For a forthright account of this perspective, cj. Pogge 2002.
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10. The Paradox of Technology
There is something mildly paradoxical aboutthis outcome. Techno-
logy has created the very problems thattechnology enables us to solve.
Global citizenship in the engaged sense 1have suggested onIy beco-
mes possible because of the very forces which rnake it necessary.
Would we have been better oft ifwe had never got into the situation in
the first place, and if we remained citizens of our local comrnunities
for whorn the idea of global citizenship remained an unactualised
ideal rather than a pressing necessity?
This nostalgic 'back to nature' response is here wholly inappropria-
te. First, because it is impossible in sorne anti-technology gesture the
tum the dock back, and also because in many ways it is undesirable.
It is undesirable because despite the dangers and problems, technolo-
gies have transformed the lives of billions from lives oí necessity to
lives of abundance. Aristotle once said that the 'polis' or state was not
just for the sake of lite but for the sake of the good life (ef Aristotle
1988). The same could be said of technology. But modern technology
is also not to be rejected because the very tendencies it has to create the
conditions oí global awareness are probably in the long run essential
to our moving to greater levels oí co-operation in the pIanet. There is
no inherent teleology in history, an unfolding into a state of complete
development, perhaps in the style oí Hegel or Marx, but nor again
have we come to the'end of history'. Ifmodem technology can help us
over the humps of lirniting nationalisms or parochialisms, then we
could be on the verge of a world in which we really are of a mind to
overcorne the problems we now face. But there is nothing inevitable
about this. We couId altematively blow ourselves or poison ourselves
into extinction.
We therefore need to control technoIogy. There is nothing inevitable
about technologies. Indeed the proIiteration of technologies simply
opens up more and more possibilities, since there is simply not the
time, energy or resources to pursue more than a few oí the endIess
possibilities which are thrown up. Where there are choices, ethical
values are relevant. Choices cannot be made without reference to
norms of sorne kind. If these norros are norrns provided by an
appropriate global ethic, then technologies which are pro-peace, pro-
genuine deveIopment or pro-environment will be preferred.
On the other hand, there seems to be a pervasive attitude that the
solutions to our global problems lie in technological solutions alone.
Teclmology will fix up the problerns it helped to create. This is rnost
striking in the case of the environment, but is actually just as relevant
to problems of poverty and violence. We thus emphasise the greening
of industry, fitting catalytic converters and so on. We use biotechnoIo-
gy to create new strains of rice or wheat, or develop new technologies
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for rural development. We build smarter weapons, or devise more so-
phisticated systems for monitoríng arros sales and so on. AH this is
important, but it surely nol enough. Without real transformations oí
attitude, such as accepting less affluent life-styles, acceptíng a sense of
solidarity with others in the world, and understanding different cul-
tures as a basis for greater peace in the world.
Global citizenship then requires modern technology, not in the sen-
se of needing it as it is} but in the sense of its being grounded in the facts
oí modern technology. We have seen tms in at least three ways: as the
causal context oí our global problems/ as that which enables global
citizenship to be effectively expressed in actionJ but also as something
to be controlled} modified and developed in the light of our global
values. Perhaps we couId conclude by saying that technology needs a
global human face} but at the same time that global citizenship needs
a flexible but strong technological backbone.
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